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ABSTRACT
It is arguable that the chief aim of Learning Analytics is to use
analytics for meaningful purposes in learning and teaching contexts,
and that research in the field should advance this cause. However
the field does not present a single clear understanding of what
constitutes quality in Learning Analytics research.
In this paper we present the Pragmatic Inquiry for Learning
Analytics Research (PILAR) method as one approach to conducting
Learning Analytics research. Rather than creating a new method,
we reintroduce an old method to a new field, drawing on the Prag-
matic Maxim, proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce as a principle for
making ideas clear. Our instantiation of the Pragmatic Maxim re-
quires the researcher to situate Learning Analytics research within
a clearly defined learning context and to consider the analytics in
terms of the practical effects on learning.We propose three essential
elements and a five step process for addressing them in research.
After presenting PILAR we address two potential limitations of
the approach, and conclude with some implications for its future
use in Learning Analytics research.
CCS CONCEPTS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Learning Analytics (LA) has embraced a definition that states the
field’s purpose as “understanding and optimising learning and the
environments in which it occurs” [6]. While this has largely been
uncontroversial amongst a community that aims to make a positive
contribution to learning, there are non-trivial questions that the
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definition leaves unanswered: To what end is ‘understanding’ to
be directed? On what basis should ‘optimising’ occur? What is
the scope of ‘the environments’? These are big questions, and it
is reasonable that they were left by the definition’s authors to be
answered by the LA community over time.
At the heart of these questions is the notion of LA quality. What
makes good LA? What should be considered good LA research?
We suggest that in order to address these questions, LA as a field
needs to approach research in a way that grounds understandings
of quality in the context in which it operates: Learning.
1.1 What are good Learning Analytics?
There appears to be no clear prescription for goodness within the
LA literature. This is not surprising given the broad transdisci-
plinary character of the LA field, and the diversity of ideas that
are embraced by it. While this diversity is arguably an important
strength, philosophical differences between the contributing fields
can result in conflicting models of quality, and competing perspec-
tives on how to assess this quality. These perspectives tend to fall
on a spectrum between a computational focus and a human focus.
Human perspectives tend to result in research that utilises mostly
qualitative methods, theory from the learning sciences and educa-
tional research, and data that is generally unstructured and small
in quantity. In contrast, computationally focused work tends to
be quantitatively driven with an analytical focus, and frequently
operates on large amounts of highly structured data. Kop et al.
[13, p. 319] concur, identifying that “a common definition of what
makes good or poor evidence is not that obvious in the EDM and LA
research community, which has brought together scientists from
‘hard’ (Computer Science) and ‘soft’ sciences (Education).”
Despite some commentary on the tendency to lean to the compu-
tational [7, 20], the LA community has generally navigated well the
littoral zone between computer science and education, embracing
the uniqueness of the contributing ecosystems while encouraging
work that blends the two (see Section 1.2). The de facto reference
for working between these perspectives has been the notion of a
‘middle space’ [21]. However, while this provides a useful construct
for understanding the complexity of the field, it does not specifically
address how to conduct research in this space, nor how the quality
of work in this space should be determined.
Issues of interfacing of fields is not unique to LA, and lack of
clarity can result in both overly optimistic hyperbole as well as
push-back and scepticism - the rhetoric around sentient Artificial
Intelligence is a current case in point. Similarly, LA also experi-
ences this phenomena with commentary both championing [9] and
condemning [5] the role of computers in learning, and in particular
the increasing use of computation in assessment. We assert that
these types of issues can be minimised by improving the clarity
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around how analytics and learning relate in good Learning Analyt-
ics. Further, we contend that strengthening LA research will aid in
improving this clarity, and that a robust method for LA research
could make a significant contribution.
1.2 LA Research Methods
Other more established fields derive their strength from deep philo-
sophical foundations and respected research methodologies that
have been tested over time. By contrast research in LA has been
characterised more by its deference to other domains, or its willing-
ness to tolerate exploration of ideas without requiring adherence
to a particular stance. Recent research papers in the field show the
diversity of research methods and the degree of acceptance of work
without a research focus.
An examination of the last two years (2016-2017) of LAK papers1
found that a quarter (56 of 224) specifically referred to research
methods (i.e. ‘methodology’ or ‘research methods’) as opposed
to other methods like computational techniques. Of these, just
over half (32) could be classified as quantitative, experimental or
empirical research. Only 8 were clearly qualitative (for example
coding of interviews or focus groups), and the other 16 covered a
variety of methods including design based methods (3 in LAK16),
Social Network Analysis (3 in LAK17), general mixed methods (4),
meta analysis (1), and other less common methods (5).
Notably, research methods that are commonly found in educa-
tional and social science research were not referred to in the papers.
These included Action Research, Critical Theory, Phenomenology,
Ethnography. An exception was Grounded Theory which appeared
in one paper but not in the context of it being a specific research
method. Although some papers may have implied research meth-
ods, even if they didn’t explicitly state them, the general lack of
method mentions appears to reflect the applied and developmental
nature of the field.
While this diversity of research methods is not necessarily prob-
lematic, one might have expected the field to have cultivated an
approach that is a custom fit, however this does not seem to be the
case.
1.3 Determining LA quality
Just as other domains have addressed central questions of quality
(e.g. What is good science? What is a substantive social theory?
What is considered quality educational research?), so too LA needs
to address the question: What is quality LA research?
When the perspectives of the practitioners of the field have
largely been imported from other domains, arriving at a unique LA
perspective is a non-trivial task. Those practitioners from fields that
are dominated by statistical analysis will tend to affirm quality in
terms of the rules of statistics, and dismiss work that does not play
by these rules. Similarly, those from fields that are theory driven
may affirmwork that takes a particular theoretical lens, and dismiss
that which is atheoretical.
As is the case in any academic community, much of these dis-
agreements of perspective are invisible, hidden within the peer
1The papers included in the proceedings given to delegates, including posters and
workshops.
review process. However, this risks marginalising some perspec-
tives while baking others into the fabric of the field, gradually
eroding diversity over time until there is only one prevailing view.
Ideally, a young field like LA would develop its own unique
position that is able to accommodate a diversity of contributing per-
spectives without surrendering to any one perspective’s demands.
That is, accommodate both analytic and learning perspectives while
being neither ‘learning with analytic help’ nor ‘analytics with an
application in learning’.
Questions of quality are also not easily resolved by examining
how LA is currently used. Scheffel et al. [19] note that “there is
no standardised instrument so far to evaluate the LA tools once
implemented.” Indeed, it appears that there is a lack of clarity on
LA quality from both its foundational fields and in its application.
If it were possible to determine LA quality without deference to
other domains, then issues with a single dominating perspective
might be averted, paving the way towards uniquely LA research
with its own consistent understanding of how to determine what is
quality LA both as research and in application. This in turn would
provide many benefits for those in the field including: a clarification
of core concepts and principles, the ability to discern the quality
of contributions to the field, the establishment of a distinct basis
for the creation of new LA knowledge, and the development of a
mechanism for evaluation.
This paper argues that a maxim proposed 140 years ago holds the
potential to address current day LA. Adopted in logic, mathematics,
science, psychology and education early in the 20th Century, and
many other fields following, its heritage together with its trans-
disciplinary nature gives it significant relevance for 21st Century
LA. This is the Pragmatic Maxim originally described by Charles
Sanders Peirce. A pragmatic approach to research is not new [4],
nor is it novel in LA [14], however this paper applies the essence
of Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim to LA research.
2 THE PRAGMATIC MAXIM
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our con-
ception to have. Then, our conception of these effects
is the whole of our conception of the object. [16]
This short quote from ‘How to make our ideas clear’ is com-
monly referred to as Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim, and although his
contemporaries William James and John Dewey developed a full
philosophy of Pragmatism, Peirce intended it to be applied in a
more limited form [17]. Peirce essentially calls for the comprehen-
sion of a thing solely in terms of that thing’s practical impact in
the world.
For LA this means understanding analytics in terms of their ef-
fects on learning. While at first glance, this may appear to be self
evident, consider a scenario where the LA researcher has a well
established and validated computational model and yet does not
know the effect the model may have on learning. In this situation
Peirce would say that the understanding of the analytics is unclear
(the conception of the effects on learning is the whole of the con-
ception of the analytics). Similarly, if there is clear understanding of
a learning process but uncertainty in the resulting analytics, then
there is actually a lack of clarity of the learning process.
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When learning and analytics is brought together in LA, learning
can no longer be conceptualised separate from analytics, nor can
analytics be conceptualised separately to the learning. According to
the Pragmatic Maxim, both would need to be understood in terms
of their practical effects on the other.
An example from James [11, p. 12] also reinforces the significance
of the principle:
To take in the importance of Peirce’s princi-
ple, one must get accustomed to applying it to
concrete cases. I found a few years ago that Ost-
wald, the illustrious Leipzig chemist, had been
making perfectly distinct use of the principle of
pragmatism in his lectures on the philosophy
of science, tho he had not called it by that name.
“All realities influence our practice,” he wrote
me, “and that influence is their meaning for us.
I am accustomed to put questions to my classes
in this way: In what respects would the world
be different if this alternative or that were true?
If I can find nothing that would become differ-
ent, then the alternative has no sense.”
The Pragmatic Maxim essentially poses the same question for
LA: In what respects would the learning be different if this LA was
working? However with LA, it can also be said that if there is no
difference (or if the difference is worse for the learner), then the LA
has no sense!
Hill [10] suggests that the Maxim is best understood in terms
of some of Peirce’s later thinking on three categories: “Reason, or
rational law, is the third of Peirce’s categories; his name for it is
Thirdness. It takes potentiality (Firstness) and transforms it into
actual existence (Secondness).” For LA, right thinking or reason is
required in order take the potential of an analytic and transform
it into a learning effect. This brings into focus how the Pragmatic
Maxim might improve the rigour of LA research. Not only does it
clarify the potential and provide for practical effects in the learning,
it does this via a well-reasoned approach.
3 PILAR
Based on the application of the Pragmatic Maxim in LA research, we
proposePILAR (Pragmatic Iquiry forLearningAnalyticsResearch)
as a research method encompassing three key elements (potential-
ity, actuality, and reason) and a five step process (contextualise,
clarify, hypothesise, apply, and evaluate). The method is detailed in
the following sections.
3.1 Potentiality
The first of the three PILAR elements is potentiality, the beginning
of inquiry. Peirce states that an irritation of doubt gives rise to
a struggle for belief, which he refers to as inquiry [15]. In doubt,
there is the potentiality for a resolution in practical effects. There
is potentiality for ideas to “fulfill their purpose in the world”[18,
CP 5.197]. However, finding the purpose or potentiality requires
one “to refer to the situation in which these ideas/statements are
produced” [12].
LA potentiality is found when the analytics are embedded in
a learning context. Without the learning context, there is only
analysis. This may still have some research value, yet it cannot
reasonably address concerns of quality in LA if it is not situated
in a way that makes its usefulness apparent. Thus, a particular
LA of concern will have maximum potential when it arises from
the irritation of doubt, and is comprehended both in terms of its
practical effects on learning, and the context of those effects.
3.2 Actuality
Actuality is found in the practical effects. It is the result of the pro-
cess of inquiry. The importance of actuality in LA is highlighted by
Beck and Xiong [2, p. 7] who explored the value of improvements
in accuracy in an Intelligent Tutoring System (ITS). They state that
“While larger datasets enable us to estimate such minuscule quan-
tities quite precisely (thus, the low p-value), it raises the question
of whether this result is useful in any way?”. In this situation the
precision of the algorithm was the goal of the work rather than
identified practical effects on student learning. Beck and Xiong [2,
p. 7] go further in their critique stating that “Ironically, as a field
we have settled on a common test problem that has little impact on
tutorial decision making or on informing the science of learning.”
Consideration of actuality guards against this situation as the re-
searchers would need to take into account how any improvement
in precision would actually impact the learning.
Further, the Pragmatic Maxim states that how we conceive of
these actual effects is the whole of our conception of the LA. This
means ultimately that the extent to which our research is actually
LA (rather than computer science for example) depends on the
extent to which it is understood in terms of the actuality of practical
effects.
3.3 Reason
Potentiality and actuality cannot exist on their own. The identifica-
tion of LA potentiality required consideration of practical effects,
and actuality is the manifestation of what we posit as potentiality.
Peirce claims that what connects the two is ‘right thinking’, a law
of reason. He makes it clear that this is a cognitive process: “The
method prescribed in the maxim is to trace out in the imagination
the conceivable practical consequences” [18, CP 8.191].
In the connection between potentiality and actuality lies the
relationship between pragmatism and the mode of reasoning Peirce
called abduction. This connection has been explored in LA by Gib-
son [8] who showed the significance of abductive reasoning for
LA, and its value for justifying the approaches that we take in
connecting the potential to the actual.
For Peirce, abduction is most closely related to hypothesis which
he saw as central to inquiry [12]. We also see this centrality of hy-
pothesis as essential for LA, and capture this in a proposed method
for LA research based on the Pragmatic Maxim.
3.4 The Process
The method at the heart of PILAR is not new or novel. Indeed James
[11] stated, “There is absolutely nothing new in the pragmatic
method. Socrates was an adept at it. Aristotle used it methodically.
Locke, Berkeley and Hume made momentous contributions to truth
by its means.” What is new is the application of the core ideas from
the Pragmatic Maxim in LA research. PILAR presents this not only
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through the elements previously described, but also as a five step
method as follows.
(1) Contextualise irritation or doubt within a clearly desig-
nated learning situation.
(2) Clarify the analytics to investigate based on practical learn-
ing effects.
(3) Hypothesise how the analytics will result in the anticipated
practical effects.
(4) Apply the hypothesis by putting it to the test in the learning
context.
(5) Evaluate the extent to which the hypothesis is true.
Although PILAR is presented here as a single process, more com-
plex programmes of research are likely to use the process iteratively.
Further explanation of the process is described in the following
sections.
3.4.1 Contextualise. PILAR requires that the research is situated
within a specific learning context. This ensures that the potentiality
is identified not according to its intrinsic merits, but according to
how it may result in practical effects within the identified context.
For example, many computational techniques used in LA have been
developed in other fields, so the potentiality for those fields are well
known. The contextualise step would require such a technique to
be reconsidered in terms of the learning context that is the subject
of the research.
3.4.2 Clarify. Once the LA has been contextualised in terms
of a specific learning context, the potentiality of the LA needs to
be identified and clarified in terms of anticipated practical effects
for the learning. This involves considering the potential analytics
in terms of learning effects and the potential learning in terms of
analytics effects. Through this process, LA is clarified in a way that
provides focus on practical results rather than other non-relevant
features. For example, if a computational feature cannot be clari-
fied in terms of a practical learning effect, then that feature may
be modified or omitted. Similarly, if a particular learning activity
cannot be captured in the analytics then it may be removed from
the research.
3.4.3 Hypothesise. The hypothesis in PILAR is a potential expla-
nation of how the LAmight result in the anticipated practical effects.
There is a creative element to the hypothesis, where the researcher
draws on insight to arrive at a new idea on how potentiality might
resolve to actuality. However, this creative hypothesising is still
grounded in the learning context of the inquiry. Aliseda [1, p. 4]
notes that “for Peirce, three aspects determine whether a hypoth-
esis is promising: it must be explanatory, testable, and economic.”.
Each of these aspects is grounded in the practical reality of the
learning. The hypothesis’ explanation should be relevant to the
learning, it should be possible to apply the hypothesis within the
learning context, and its application should be achievable within
the resources of the learning context.
3.4.4 Apply. The fourth step of PILAR is to apply the hypothesis
in the learning context. This application needs to be designed to test
the truth of the hypothesis, determining the extent to which the LA
results in the anticipated practical learning effects. The application
of the hypothesis should realise potentiality and result in actuality.
3.4.5 Evaluate. Finally, PILAR requires that the whole process
be evaluated. As this is LA research, evaluation is more than assess-
ing the results of the application of our hypothesis. It also involves
judging the extent to which our whole approach to LA is robust and
defensible. Rigorous defensible research with PILAR will show clear
potentiality connected to actuality through good reasoning, with
the all elements situated in a clearly articulated learning context.
Existing LA work on the Evaluative Framework for LA (EFLA) by
Scheffel et al. [19] could provide a high quality approach to this
step.
3.5 Aggregate and Constituent Research
It is important to recognise that PILAR is a method of inquiry and
therefore is only complete to the extent to which it leaves no further
doubt in the line of inquiry. This of course is dependent on how
the line of inquiry is scoped, and as James [11] states is less likely
to present in a solution than a programme of work:
But if you follow the pragmatic method, you cannot
look on any suchword as closing your quest. Youmust
bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at
work within the stream of your experience. It appears
less as a solution, then, than as a program for more
work, and more particularly as an indication of the
ways in which existing realities may be CHANGED.
For this reason another important aspect of PILAR is trans-
parency on how the research work might contribute to what might
be considered a fully complete LA. To this end, we suggest that
researchers articulate the extent to which their work is constituent
and contributes to an existing or future LA agenda, and/or it is
aggregate and incorporates prior LA constituent research in order
to deliver a more complete LA. Some within the LA community
have described this as closing the loop [3].
Importantly, there is no suggestion here that constituent research
is somehow inadequate, but that it should be distinguished from
aggregate research in its contribution to the field. Further it may
be that some programmes of research make both a constituent and
aggregate contribution and this should also be acknowledged.
It is anticipated that making the distinction clear between aggre-
gate and constituent research will assist LA researchers in identify-
ing the way that their work contributes to the new knowledge of
the field.
4 PROVOCATIONS AND RESPONSES
At this point, we recognise that some may be sceptical of our pro-
posal of PILAR as a research method for LA, and so we address what
we consider to be two significant arguments against this approach
in the form of provocations and address each with a response.
4.1 PILAR is unnecessarily restrictive
4.1.1 Provocation: The Pragmatic Maxim restricts inference by
tethering it to those outcomes that can be perceived (read: mea-
sured). What’s more, it defines constructs with respect to measured
outcomes. The immediate ramifications of this approach are that
those areas without easily measured outcomes are ignored leading
to a dearth of exploration in areas that may be important. But more
seriously, it may hinder the generalizability of any finding that
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as measures, which will define constructs, may not be replicable
across contexts. An extreme version being that each course would
need its own measures and constructs, a version of the Psychology
of Lykken in which every human requires their own version of
psychology to be understood. This would shrink the practical utility
of learning analytics to an unusable extent.
4.1.2 Response: While it is true that PILAR is restricted to an-
ticipated practical effects, the limitation is imposed not so much
by the method, than by the imagination of the researcher. Peirce
addresses the point as follows:
It allows any flight of imagination, provided this imag-
ination ultimately alights upon a possible practical
effect; and thus many hypotheses may seem at first
glance to be excluded by the pragmatical maxim that
are not really so excluded. (1903; Peirce 1997:249-50)
Further, there is an assumption in the provocation that a practical
effect must be ‘measured’ and by inference quantified, however PI-
LAR only requires that the effect be identifiable and be attributable
to the application of the hypothesis. In a learning context, there
may well be a positive impact on the learning from the application
of a hypothesis without that impact being measurable. For example,
a student may respond more enthusiastically to an activity. This
may be qualitatively identifiable even if it is not measurable.
4.2 PILAR depends on causality
4.2.1 Provocation: A great deal of educational research involves
probabilistic modelling, and many of the concepts involved in prob-
ability theory were not available to Pierce at the time he wrote the
Pragmatic Maxim or had not been applied to behavioural research.
And it is unclear whether the Pragmatic Maxim is compatible with
a probabilistic methodology.
PILAR asserts strong links between observation and construct
but no assumption of causality demonstrated by antecedent. Rather
theories are measured as valid through their applicability to de-
sired outcomes and can be applied when the measurement and the
construct it measures can both be interpreted as probabilistic. If
we are unsure about both whether the measurement is accurate
and whether we are observing the thing we intended to, the PILAR
may not be applicable or very few analytic methods may meet its
stringent limitations.
4.2.2 Response: Once again there is an assumption that practi-
cal effects means quantifiable and directly linked. However, in both
the writings of Peirce and James a main concern of Pragmatism
was to resolve metaphysical disputes without any idea of dismiss-
ing a perspective that was not measurable or quantifiable. As a
case in point, James introduces the idea of Pragmatism through an
example of resolving a metaphysical dispute about a squirrel and
a tree [11]. This illustration is entirely behavioural, and does not
appeal to measurement as a mechanism for determining practical
effects. Rather, the point of view of the observer determines how
the dispute is resolved.
Likewise PILAR does not depend on a quantified understanding
of causality in order to make the link between LA and practical
effects. Rather it grounds the approach in a perspective that is
relevant to the learning context, whether that be behaviour that is
qualitatively observed, a feature that is statistical modelled or some
element that is directly measurable.
5 CONCLUSION
The transdisciplinary nature of LA has meant that much of the re-
search to date has drawn on methods from contributing fields. This
has enabled the field to grow, but presents difficulties to researchers
attempting to answer questions of quality.
In response to this issue, we outlined PILAR, a research method
for LA that is drawn from Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim. PILAR forces
us to confront the relationship between analytics and learning that
is central to LA. It requires research to address how LA might result
in practical learning effects, as opposed to more information about
learning with little practical consequence.
In turn, we hope that PILAR will make a contribution to address-
ing questions of quality within LA research and to the ongoing
development of the field.
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